all the southern states against the saffronization of any institution, despite rest of the southern states (Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala) turned down the issue raised by M. K. Stalin.
Trajectories of Dravidian Movement -from territorial to cultural nationalism:
Historically, the Dravidian movement, one of the 'Asia's oldest and most durable ethnonational movements' (Subramanian, 1999, p. 15) , was started on the basis of three separate issues and these issues were converged in a secessionist demand. The issues were: firstly, ethnocultural issues -Dravidian culture were followed by the majority of the people in erstwhile Madras Province and Brahmins were regarded as cultural invaders came from north India.
Traditional Dravidian culture seemed to be more egalitarian than north Indian version of Hindu culture imposed upon the Dravidians by the Brahmins. It was primarily an anti-Brahmin nationalist movement. Secondly, language -more than 90% of the population spoke Dravidian family language (Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam) in the last decade of the British Raj.
Dravidianism opposed politically dominant language Hindi. Entire south India was trembled by anti-Hindi agitation in 1965. Lastly, Religious impulse -early Dravidian movement had promoted atheism which supposed as the Dravidianist response to the humiliations imposed upon the lower castes by the Brahmanical Hinduism (Ziegfeld, 2003, p. 282) . Based on this religious philosophy, early activists of the Dravidian movement publicly destroyed considerable amount of statues of Hindu deities and also organized self-respect marriage, 'wedding ceremonies conducted in Dravidianist families ritually validated by the speeches of political leaders rather than religious rituals performed by priests' (Subramanian, 1999, p. 108) with Sanskrit Mantras.
However, this version of religious response never gained wide acceptance in Tamil Nadu (Ziegfeld, 2013, p. 283) .
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The root of Dravidian politics dates back to pre-independence period when this part was known as Madras Presidency under the British Raj. Dravidian movement was initiated with a militant demand for secession and it opposed the Brahmin caste. Dravidianism with a 'territorially rooted nation' while DK looked for the 'aggregate of megacastes' (Subramanian, 1999, p. 142) . Transformation of the ideological differences between DK and DMK can be highlighted by the English translation of both the parties' name. Dravidar
Kazhagam means 'Party of the Dravidians'. It highlights a group of people known as Dravidians.
On the other hand, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam means 'Party for the Progress of the Dravidam'. It refers to a land or country that is Dravidam. DMK was the first which specified the territorial boundary for a separate country supposed as Dravida Nadu, the place for Dravidians.
For Annadurai, Dravida Nadu and Tamil Nadu were synonymous because all the Dravidians (south Indians) speak the language of Dravida language family. (Subramanian, 1999, p. 142) .
Then, 'Tamil Nadu [was] the first Indian state in which separatist/autonomist impulses developed despite initial enthusiasm about the creation of the Indian Union' (Subramanian, 1999, p. 131) . But, since late 1960s and 1970s, all the potential issues for a secessionist movement in Tamil Nadu became non-issues through Indian typical model of federalism. Reasons laid on the rejection of a unitary state, the acceptance of multiple but complementary identities, the upholding of regional languages, maintenance of English as a 'link language', and the creation of mutually beneficial alliances between polity-wide and centric-regional parties (Stepan, 2010, pp. 350-370 More or less, success of a political movement profoundly rests on the efficiency of the political elites who are able to successfully mobilize the masses using the popular issues, like ethnicity, culture and language, religion, caste, land, so on and so forth, intending to hold the political power. If end is pursuing the political power then mean is construction of a popular movement using popular issues in order to secure mass support. Dravidian movement can be seen by two distinct approaches -constructivist and instrumentalist. Demand of the Dravida Nadu is not the demand of the people state wide but an elite construction. Following A. D. Smith (1999, p. 30) , Tamil people might be defined as an ethnie due to their myths of common lineage, 'shared historical memories and one or more elements of a common culture', common literature, common heroes, 'an association with a homeland', and most importantly, 'some degree of solidarity, at least among elites'. Therefore, Tamil community as a 'cohesive' and 'politicized'
ethnie is an elite construction as it had been shaped politically, in its earlier phase, by the Justice Party and Self-Respect Association. Furthermore, Tamil identity is being used by the elites as an instrument to mobilize the masses to enjoy political dividend. Historically, all the parties associated at different times -the Justice Party, the Self-Respect Association, the DK, and the DMK -all of them put an attack on privilege, and to the shifts which took place from antiBrahmanism to Tamilism, from an identity based on race to language, and from territorial nationalism or secessionism to cultural nationalism (Harriss, 2001 (Harriss, 2001) . And it happened to the Dravidian parties, especially to the DMK. As in another writing John Harriss speaks of 'the renewal of caste conflict in the state, it is rather hard to accept the notion that Dravidian populism has been such a great "success"' because, as he further writes, 'it is widely felt the rule of Dravidian parties has become increasingly authoritarian, and focused on "the Page 10 of 19
leader" -at the centre' (Harriss, 2003, p. 105) . M.S.S. Pandian also claims that uneven development and caste arrogance among non-Brahmin elite castes in Tamil society led to rise serious tensions in Tamil Nadu (Pandian, 1994 League (IPL) matches in Chennai when Tamil Nadu is undergoing an acute water crisis and thus agrarian crisis. Tamil Nadu's situation is much more severe because 'over one-third of its population lives in the Cauvery basin and depends upon the river Cauvery for virtually all its needs' (Janakarajan, 2016) . Tamil people extended their campaign not only against the Karnataka government, but also against the Supreme Court along with the Centre because either of them failed to ensure the legitimate right to use water of the river Cauvery.
As touched upon earlier, language is crucial to be taken as a serious issue in Tamil and Ministers as it is only recommendatory and not mandatory; it is in the form of a request and does not entail any form of Order/Instruction. But it goes without saying that these clarifications are not adequate to pacify the disquiet not only in Tamil Nadu, but in other non-Hindi speaking states.
Another issue is Jallikattu, a cultural event with bulls takes place during a harvest festival of Pongal. Jallikattu, derived from two words Jalli (coins) and Kattu (tied), literally means 'grabbing a bag of coins tied to the horns of the bulls' (Kalaiyarasan, 2017) , attracted the world's attention after being banned by the Supreme Court of India in 2014 preceded by a petition made under the banner of Animal Welfare board of India (AWBI) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). It was banned allegedly that 'the sport is not about bull taming but embracing them' (Kalaiyarasan, 2017) . On the other hand, for the supporters of Jallikattu, it became 'a symbol of pride' since this ban can be seen as an attack on Tamil culture and identity.
Jallikattu issue became important in 2017 because it triggered another issue -anti-centre strand of Tamil masses. So, as 'the anti-Hindi agitation was not simply about the language, [likewise]
Jallikattu protest was not just about a sport' (Kalaiyarasan, 2017) rather it has a greater implication to shape the recent Tamil politics. Jallikattu protest upturns another question relating to the Cauvery water issue. The slogans and placards in Jallikattu protest probed 'why Tamil Nadu should respect the Supreme Court when it cannot enforce the water rights of Tamil Nadu' (Kalaiyarasan, 2017) . Andhra Pradesh went almost more than double. Leaders from the southern states point out the discrepancy that the more who have worked well on population control, the more they will lose out on benefits. On the other hand, comparatively, northern states have lagged to control population, but they will get more financial benefits. Nilakantan R.S. (2018) indicates the poor budgetary expenditure of the southern states vis-à-vis their opulent contributions to the national GDP. For example, while Tamil Nadu's GSDP is 15.9 lakh crore, Uttar Pradesh's is 14.8 lakh crore, but total budget expenditure of Tamil Nadu is 1.1 lakh crore while Uttar Pradesh has 1.5 lakh crore for 2018-19. That is, 'if these two states were independent entities, Tamil Nadu's economic output would be higher than that of Uttar Pradesh's notwithstanding the latter being three times more populous than the former' [but] 'Uttar Pradesh has a budget outlay that's 36%
higher than Tamil Nadu despite having an economy that's 7% smaller' (Nilakantan, 2018 
Epilogue:
M. K. Stalin recycles Dravida Nadu with several specific reasons. The DMK is now in opposition in Tamil Nadu government from last eight years and hunting for an issue to remobilize the people in favour of them. Notwithstanding gigantic scams cast a shadow in Jayalalithaa's political career as well as her personal image but the paternalist (better to say maternal in this case particularly) populist stance such as welfare schemes to the poor people made 'her transformation from Golden Lady of the 1980s to the revolutionary leader of 1990s, to her final avatar as "Amma" (Mother)' to the common people (Karthikeyan, 2018) . After demise of Jayalalithaa, popular sympathy is with AIADMK despite AIADMK is undergoing some internal crises like civil war 3 and corruption. The DMK also wants to regain its support base after (Krishnan, 2018) . As, epistemologically, Dravidian movement is based on caste inequality between non-Aryan, non-brahmin Dravida people and Aryan Brahmin people, then caste identity and religious impulse are very much embedded in Dravidian politics. Though, Kamal Hasan defines Dravidian identity as based on geography to mobilize people beyond the caste identity. Rajinikanth clarifies his politics above religion and caste despite he embraces spiritual basis of politics primarily rejecting secularism (Krishnan, 2018) .
So, DMK is supposed to compete with this new kind of political vigour in its upcoming future. DMK's demand of Dravida Nadu needs to be seen from this angle too. The demand for Dravida Nadu is like 'make hay while the sun shines' and a political trick in order to mobilize
Page 17 of 19 the Tamils in favour of DMK. Though the Dravidian movement pivoted on the secessionist demand, but it is also worth considering that secession never became an extreme mass sentiment in south India. But, sometimes, the Dravidian parties use this 'language of secession' for mobilizing people in favour of them in electoral combat zone even after officially giving up the demand of separate statehood (Stepan, 2010, pp. 348-349) . In a nutshell, Dravida Nadu highlights the antagonism between unjust distribution of economic resources by the central government and resistance of Tamil Nadu along with south Indian states. It is also indicative to the resistance against the endeavour of cultural and linguistic domination of north India over south India. It indicates a confrontation between pan-Indian nationalism and south-Indian subnationalism. Finally, it is a political ploy of DMK for mobilizing the people and rebuild a support base to grasp the political power.
_________________
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